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Abstract:  In a recent paper entitled “Putting Risk in its Proper Place”, Eeckhoudt and 
Schlesinger (2006) established a theorem linking the sign of the n-th derivative of an agent’s 
utility function to her preferences among pairs of simple lotteries. We characterize these 
lotteries and show that, in a given pair, they only differ by their moments of order greater than 
or equal to n. When the n-th derivative of the utility function is positive (negative) and n is 
odd (even), the agent prefers a lottery with higher (lower) n+2p-th moments for p belonging 
to the set of positive integers. This result links the preference for disaggregation of risks 
across states of nature and the structure of moments preferred by mixed risk averse agents. It 
can be viewed as a generalization of a proposition appearing in Ekern (1980) which focused 
only on the differences in the n-th moments. 
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Introduction 
Risk aversion, prudence and temperance have been extensively studied in the literature and they are 
mainly characterized in two ways. Some economists prefer to define these concepts by signing the 
derivatives of the utility function, others refer to behavioural traits. For example, prudence is shown to 
be linked to a precautionary savings motive by Kimball (1990), or, equivalently, as a “location 
preference” by Eeckhoudt et al.(1995).  If a prudent agent has to bear a new risk but may choose to 
locate it on wealthy or less wealthy states of nature, he will always choose to locate it on the wealthy 
states. The other way to characterize prudence is the positive sign of the third derivative of the utility 
function. In the same vein, temperate agents dislike mutually aggravating risks (Kimball, 1993). When 
such an agent bears a risk  1 ε   on a subset of states of nature  1 Ω  and has to bear a new risk  2 ε  , she 
prefers to attach it, if possible, to the complementary set  1
c Ω . 
For higher order preferences, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) introduce risk apportionment of order 
n by imposing preferences among pairs of lotteries built through a nesting process. Their essential 
result establishes the link between this risk apportionment and the n-th derivative of the utility 
function. 
In this paper, we first recall the process used by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) to build the 
sequence of lottery pairs but we present this process in a more “probabilistic” way. It then makes 
easier the analysis of the moments of these lotteries and allows us to explain directly the structure of 
preferences among the pairs when agents exhibit mixed risk aversion. 
A utility function u exhibits mixed risk aversion, as defined by Caballé and Pomansky (1996), if u is 
infinitely differentiable and the derivatives of u  are  alternating in sign, more precisely, 
() ()
1 () sgn 1
n n u
+ =− for any positive integer n. Using the terminology of Ekern (1980), we can say that 
the agent is n-th degree risk averse for any integer n.  
This class of functions includes most of the commonly used utility functions as the negative 
exponential or the power utility functions. This assumption is then not too restrictive. We then build 
on Eeckoudt and Schlesinger (2006) who link the sign of the n-th derivative of u to the preferences   4
among pairs of simple lotteries. Their main tool is the utility premium of a lottery which is the 
difference of expected utility obtained by the agent with and without the lottery. Our approach 
is, in a sense, more natural, since we use directly the successive moments of the lotteries to 
establish the preferences among pairs of lotteries.   
These lotteries, denoted as( , ) nn AB, are obtained through a nesting process for  3 n ≥  which is 
in the spirit of  the sequence of  “odd” and “even” lotteries appearing in proposition 3.1 of Caballé and 
Pomansky (1996). 
 For n = 3 and 4, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) link their result to the concepts of prudence and 
temperance introduced by Miles Kimball (1990, 1992), and, for n = 5, to “edginess” (Fatima Lajeri-
Chaherli, 2004). For orders larger than 5, they introduce the term “risk apportionment of order n” 
which means that agents prefer to disaggregate risk across states of nature. 
Our purpose in this paper is to show that the moments of the lotteries (,) nn AB satisfy very peculiar 
properties. We first demonstrate that the moments of order k < n of the two lotteries are equal for 
every n. We then show that the sign of the difference of the n-th moments depends on the parity of n. 
When n is odd(even), the mixed risk averse agent prefers the lottery characterized by the largest 
(lowest) n-th moment. These results may also be deduced of a paper by Ekern (1980); in this paper, 
the proof was based on “n-th degree risk increase” and used integration by parts. 
Our results extend Ekern’s proposition by showing that the moments of order n + 2p (p being any 
positive integer) are equal in magnitude but have opposite signs when n is odd. When n is even, the 
lottery with the lower moments of order (n + 2p) is preferred.  
Our results are also interesting for experimental purposes. They allow to test if agents prefer low or 
high (n + 2p)-th moments when moments of order lower than n are equal. They can then be used to 
test the relevance of the mixed risk aversion assumption.   
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I.  Notations and preliminary results 
Denote (,) x y  a pair of lotteries, u a mixed risk averse utility function and W the initial wealth of the 
agent characterized by u. x   preferred to  y  means: 
[ ] [ ] () () EuW x EuW y +≥ +        ( 1 )  






uW E x y
+∞
=
⎡⎤ − ≥ ⎣⎦ ∑        ( 2 )  
This inequality is obviously satisfied if for every n we have: 
() () 0
nn n uW E x y ⎡⎤ − ≥ ⎣⎦        ( 3 )  
u being mixed risk averse, the sign of 
() ()
n uW is 
1 (1 )
n+ − . Inequality (3) is then satisfied if either 
the n-th moments of the two lotteries are equal or if 
1 sgn ( 1)
nn n Ex y
+ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ −= − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦        ( 4 )  
In the following sections, we will show that the pairs (,) nn AB defined hereafter satisfy such a 
property. It is worth to note that the Taylor series expansion in inequality (2) is not truncated. 
Therefore, we have to prove inequality (3) for every integer n. It is in fact well known that preferences 
for some moments are not sufficient to ensure preferences for a probability distribution over another 
one. For example, it is often argued that gamblers prefer positive skewness but preference for a larger 
third moment is in general not compatible with Expected Utility (EU) maximization, except if the 
utility function is cubic. Menezes et al. (1980) and more recently Shiu (2008) provide skewness 
comparability conditions under which EU maximization and a larger third moment are equivalent.   
Let now (,) x y  denote a pair of random variables (possibly degenerate) and let   [ ] , zx y =    denote a 
compound lottery which takes the results  or  x y   with equal probabilities. The simplified notation [ ] x   
means that the result  x   has a probability equal to 1. As an illustration, assume that   and  x y   are binary 
lotteries respectively taking values  12 (, ) x x   and  12 (, ) y y . The realization of z  is obtained in two   6
steps: first, a coin toss is realized to select either  12 (, ) x x   o r   12 (, ) y y . Then, another draw is 
performed to get the first or the second outcome, according to the probability distribution of the 
variable drawn in the first step,   or  x y  .  
We now recall the process used by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) (ES in the following) to build a 
nested sequence of lotteries to link derivatives of utility functions to behavioral characteristics of 
agents. Remember that the usual concepts of monotonic preferences and risk aversion mean 
respectively that agents prefer more than less and that they are averse to mean preserving spreads. 
These basic concepts lead to the following definition for the two first pairs of lotteries. 
1) [ ] [ ] [ ] 12 1 1 2 ,, 0 Ak A B B ε =− = = =   where  1 ε   is a binary random variable taking equally likely 
values  11 (; ) ε ε − ,  1 ε  and  k being positive constants.  
Monotonic preferences then imply that  1 B  is preferred to  1 A  and risk aversion means that  2 B  is 
preferred to 2 A . 
















     ( 5 )  
Obviously, it is not the definition initially given by Kimball (1990) but ES show that the two coincide. 
The important point here is to remark that the difference between  3 B  and  3 A is the « location » of the 
new risk 1 ε  . Prudent agents prefer not to add  1 ε   on the « wealthy » state or, alternatively, they 
prefer a wealth reduction – k in the less risky state.  
To introduce the nesting process in an intuitive way, remark that: 
[ ] [ ]
[] [ ]
31 1 1 1











      ( 6 )  
3 A is obtained by adding the new risk  1 ε   to [ ] 11 ; AB on the A lottery when  3 B  is built by attaching 
1 ε   to the B lottery.    7
3) Temperance is now characterized by the preferences over lotteries  4 A  and  4 B  defined as 
follows:  
[ ] [ ]
[] [ ]
41 2 2 2 2











     (7) 
where  2 ε    is independent of  1 ε   and takes two equally likely values  22 (; ) ε ε − . A temperate agent  
will prefer  4 B  over  4 A . She prefers to attach the new risk  2 ε   to the less risky situation.  
4) ES pursue the nesting process of lotteries and provide a general definition of the sequence (,) nn AB 
as follows: 
5) For  3 n ≥  
2( / 2 ) 2
2( / 2 ) 2
;
;
nn I n t n n







⎧ ⎡⎤ =+ ⎪⎣ ⎦
⎨
⎡⎤ =+ ⎪ ⎣⎦ ⎩


        ( 8 )  
where  Int(x) denotes the largest integer lower than x. The variables  ,1 j j ε ≥   are assumed to be 
independent and defined in the same way as  1 ε  . 
Table 1 summarizes the definitions of the lotteries for  4 n ≤ . As mentioned before, when n =1, 2, 
preferring B to A  means monotonicity and risk aversion. When n = 3, preferring B means that prudent 
agents prefer supplementary risks in wealthier states. When n = 4, the same kind of interpretation may 
be done with “less risky states” instead of “wealthier states”. In other words, agents dislike mutually 
aggravating risks. 
Table I around here 
 
n A  and  n B  are compound lotteries and their definition means that a first coin is tossed to select one of 
the two lotteries appearing between brackets. Then, a state of nature is revealed which gives a value to 
the lottery selected in the first toss.  
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II. Risk apportionment 
Definition 1 
Preferences are said to satisfy risk apportionment of order n if, for the lotteries (,) nn AB defined 
above, the individual always prefer  n B  to  n A . 
Risk apportionment then means that agents prefer to disaggregate risks across states of nature. The 
essential result of Louis Eeckhoudt and Harris Schlesinger (2006, pp 286) is the following.  
Theorem 1 
In an expected utility framework with differentiable u, risk apportionment of order n is equivalent to 
the condition sgn
() 1 (1 )
nn u
+ ⎡⎤ =− ⎣⎦  where sgn(.) is the sign function valued 1 ( -1 ) if the argument is 
positive (negative). 
 
In their paper, ES provide some details about the interpretation of this theorem for n = 3, 4, 5, in terms 
of prudence, temperance and edginess. However, they do not study the properties of the nested 
sequence of lotteries(,) nn AB, and especially they do not analyze the moments of these lotteries. Our 
purpose in this paper is to investigate the successive moments of  n A  and  n B  and to show that they are 
closely related. Moreover, they directly explain the preferences among lotteries for mixed risk averse 
agents. 
A.  The moments of  n A  and  n B  for n = 3. 
To provide an intuition of our general results, we first consider the case n = 3.  3 A  and  3 B  are defined 
as follows: 
[ ] [ ]
[] [ ]
31 1 1 1







⎧ =+ = − ⎪
⎨ =+ = − ⎪ ⎩


     ( 9 )  
Getting the final values of  3 A  and  3 B  implies two coin tosses. The first one specifies the random 
variable to be observed, the second one gives the observation of this variable. For example, if the first 
toss selects  1 k ε −   for  3 A , the second one gives  1 k ε −  or  1 k ε − − . Obviously, if 0 is selected at the   9
first toss, the second toss also gives this value. Strictly speaking, three states of nature are sufficient to 
describe the process but it is more comfortable to consider 
1 2
n−  states when studying (,) nn AB.  In 














− ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ − ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ==
⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ −
⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ − −− ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
    (10) 
The probability of each of the four values is then ¼. 

















⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ − ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ −= −=
⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ +−
⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ −+ −− ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
    (11) 
Let  () () ()
k

























       ( 1 2 )  
The two lotteries differ by their 3
rd moments which are equal in magnitude but exhibit opposite signs. 
More precisely, the preferred lottery has a positive skewness. The definition of the lotteries for n = 3 
also implies that all odd central moments have opposite signs because  33 () B EB −  and 
33 () AE A −+ take the same values (except that the two last values are exchanged but it has no 























⎡ ⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ =− + + + −− ⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ =+ − + − + ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
   (13)   10
When n is even, () 1
n −  = 1 and the two moments are equal. If n is odd, we can use the convexity of 
the function 
n x x →  to show that  3 () n M B > 0. Rearranging  3 () n M B  leads to: 
3
1






MB εε ⎡ ⎤⎛⎞ =− + + − ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎝⎠
    (14) 
and the mean of ()
2
n k
ε −  and ()
2
n k






.   
B.  The moments of  n A  and  n B  for n = 4. 
For n = 4, the definition of (,) nn AB leads to: 
[ ] [ ]
[] [ ]
42 2 2 2 1







⎧ =+ = + ⎪
⎨ =+ = ⎪ ⎩
 
 
      ( 1 5 )  


























⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ −
⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ − ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ == ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ +
⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
−− + ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ −
⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
−− − ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
     ( 1 6 )  
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=+ = + +
    (17) 
The first (non central) moment of  4 A  and  4 B  is 0. This property is preserved for moments of 
higher odd orders. In fact we have, for any integer j:   11
() () () ( ) ( )
( ) () ( ) () ( )
41 1 2 2















=+ −+ + −
= + +− + − +−
    (18) 
When j is odd, the two moments are zero and when j is even,  
()
() () ( )
41 2

















      ( 1 9 )  
The convexity of the function 
j x x → also implies here that  44 () () jj M AM B > .  
The following section provides a proof of the same kind of results for any positive integer n. 
 
III. The general result 
The analysis of the moments of n A  and  n B  is divided in two parts, distinguished by the parity of n. It 
is justified by the fact that the first moments are 0 (different from 0) when n is even (odd).  
Proposition 1  
Let  4 n ≥ even: 
22
1 )   () ()  f o r  2
2)  odd, ( ) ( ) 0 
3 )  F o r   0 ,   () ()  
jn jn
jn jn
np n np n
M AM B j n
jM A M B




         
Proof 
2 A  and  2 B  are zero-mean random variables. Since  n A  and  n B  are built from  2 n A −  and  2 n B −  by 
adding a zero-mean risk, all the variables  n A  and  n B  are also zero-mean variables. Central moments 
and non-central moments are then equal. The following lemma (the proof is reported in the appendix) 













EA EB E A





⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =+ + ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =+ + ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦


     ( 2 0 )  







0    4,   
2 2
Int j
jj p j pj p
nn m n n
p
j







⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ∀> ≥ − = − ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎝⎠ ∑  
 
Due to the results of the preceding section, we already know that: 







   odd,  0











      ( 2 1 )  










jj p j pj p
p
j






⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −= − ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎝⎠ ∑     (22) 
For 3 j = , the sum contains only one term, equal to 0. For j > 3 odd and n = 4, the result is also 
true due to Eq. (21) and lemma 1. Iterating the process, we get that odd moments of  n A  and  n B  
are equal for every even n. 
When j is even lower than n, the reasoning takes the same kind of road. From section II we know 









jj p j pj p
p
j






⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ −= − ⎜⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
⎝⎠ ∑    (23) 
The terms on the RHS are equal to zero because j – 2p is strictly lower than 4. It is then sufficient 
to increase n by steps of 2 to get the general result. 
2)  Let j denote a given odd number: 
[ ] [ ] 22 odd, 0  jj jM A M B ∀= =      ( 2 4 )  
This equality comes from results in section II.  
We now show that if odd moments are 0 up to n-2, they are also 0 for n. 







































⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎝⎠
⎛⎞











































⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎝⎠
⎛⎞




   (26) 
Since odd moments are 0 up to n – 2, it is also true for n since j-2p’ is always odd. 
3)  Consider now even moments of order j n ≥ . We have to show that  0
jj
nn EA EB ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ −> ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ . 










jj p j pj p
p
j






⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ −= − ⎜⎟ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
⎝⎠ ∑   (27) 
All the terms in the sum are positive (see Eq. (24)). 





















⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ −= − ⎜⎟ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
⎝⎠ ∑   (28) 
 
We analyze now the case of “odd” lotteries.  
Proposition 2 
Let  3 n ≥ odd: 
1 )   () ()  f o r  2
2) 3 odd, ( ) ( )
3 )  F o r    o d d ,   () ()  
jn jn
jn jn
np n np n
MA MB jn







The essential difference between propositions 1 and 2 is that the variables  n A  and  n B  have a non-zero 









EA EB E A k
EB EA E B k
ε
ε
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =+ + = − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =+ + = − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦


    (29) 
For greater odd values of n, the expectations are the same because theε   are zero-mean random 
variables.   14
1) The proof of proposition 2, dealing with central moments, is a little bit more involved than 
proposition 1 even if the formulation of the results is very close. The central moments can be 
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⎛⎞ ⎡⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎠
⎛⎞ ⎡⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎠
∑
∑
    (30) 






jn jn n n
q
j k





⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎡ ⎤⎡⎤ −= − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ∑     (31) 
When n = 3 and j < n, the RHS of Eq. (31) is 0 thanks to the results in section II. In the general case, 
we assume that  [ ] [ ] 22 jn jn MA MB −− =  for j < n – 2 and we prove that  [ ] [ ] jn jn M AM B =  for j < n. 
The following lemma will be useful for that purpose (the proof is reported in the appendix). 
Lemma 2 
For p < n – 2 and j < n, we have the relationship: 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 22
jj
pn pn jn jn n n M AM B M A M B E A E B −− ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ =⇒ − = − ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦      ( 3 2 )  
This lemma shows that it is sufficient to work with non central moments and to prove that 
jj
nn EA EB ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ . We now use the definition of the lotteries to formulate the difference of moments, 







jj p j pj p
nn m n n
p
j







⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −= − ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎝⎠ ∑   (33) 
As 0 m E ε ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ , the first non-zero term in the RHS corresponds to p = 2. We then see that the RHS is 
equal to 0 when n = 3. Iterating the process, we obtain: 






jj p j pj p
p
j






⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −= − ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎝⎠ ∑   (34) 
But the RHS is one more time equal to 0 because j – p < n – 2. The following iterations lead to the 
same result.    15
3)  The following lemma shows that one of the relationships used with n even is also true when n 
is odd. 
Lemma 3 





jn jn jn m MA MB MA ε −− ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =+ + ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦      (35) 
The proof is reported in the appendix. 
From section II, we know that  33   jj M AM B ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =− ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦  for j odd. Assume that it is true up to n – 2. 
Lemma 3 allows to write: 




jn jn jn jn jn m jn m MA MB MA MB MA MB εε −− − − ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ += + + + ++ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦   
 (36) 
The first term on the RHS is equal to 0 since it refers to the index n – 2. Moreover 







jn m jn m m j pn j pn
p
j
MA MB E M A M B
p
εε ε − − −− −−
=
⎛⎞
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ++ += + ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎝⎠ ∑     (37) 
But for odd values of p,  0
p
m E ε ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦  and when p is even  22 0 jp n jp n MA MB −− −− ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ + = ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ because j – 
p is odd. 








jn jn m j pn j pn
p
j





⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −= − ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎝⎠ ∑    (38) 
From section II, we kow that  22 0 jj MA MB ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ − > ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ . The above equation implies this inequality is 
also satisfied for n = 4. It is then sufficient to iterate the reasoning to get the result. 
 
Table II around here 
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IV Concluding remarks 
Table 2 summarizes the results contained in propositions 1 and 2. These two propositions 
share some common features, especially in points (1) and (3). The first point stipulates that the j – th 
central moments of the two lotteries  n A  and  n B  are equal for j < n. At order n, the difference between 
the moments depend on the parity of n. When n is even, the odd moments of n A  and  n B  are equal to 
zero and when n is odd, the moments are equal in magnitude but exhibit opposite signs. Finally, when 
j  >  n, the j-th moments are equal to 0 when n  is even and have opposite signs when n  is odd. 
Concerning the economic interpretation of theorem 1, we observe that when the sign of the n-th 
derivative (n even) of the utility function is negative, the agent prefers the lottery with the lowest n +  
2p-th moments. For example, if n = 4, it means that not only the kurtosis defines the preference over 
the pair of lotteries but all the even moments greater or equal to 4. When n is odd, the prudent agent 
prefers higher n + 2p-th moments. These results give some insights to test preferences in experimental 
settings.   17
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APPENDIX 
Proof of lemma 1 
For each even n, the central moments of  n A  and  n B  may be written as: 
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The product of expectations comes from the independence of the variables ε  . However, odd moments 
of these variables are equal to 0. The moment of order 2p of  m ε  is equal to 
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Replacing expressions (A2) and (A3) in (A1) leads directly to the result and ends the proof of lemma 
1. 
 
Proof of lemma 2 
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The assumption of the lemma implies that the terms on the RHS of (A5) are equal to 0 as soon as q is 
greater or equal to 1, that is to say j – q – p < n - 2. Eq. (9) is then reduced to: 
[ ] [ ]
jj
jn jn n n M AM BE A E B ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ −= − ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦  
 











⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =+ = ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
∑  





nn n m EA EB E A ε
− −−
−− ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ =++ ⎣⎦ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
  





pp jj jp jp
jn n n m
pp
jj kk












jn jn jn m MA MB MA ε −− ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =+ + ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦     20
 
 
n A  B 
1  [ ] k −   [ ] 0  
2  [ ] 1 ε    [ ] 0  
3  [ ] 1 0; k ε −    [ ] 1 ; k ε −   
4  [ ] 12 0;ε ε +    [ ] 12 ; ε ε  
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  n even  n odd 
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